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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
This case requires us to consider whether, by including 
“without just cause or excuse” in the federal assault with a 
dangerous weapon statute, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), Congress 
intended to convert justification, ordinarily a common-law 
defense, into an element of the offense as to which the 
government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Applying relevant Supreme Court precedent, we 
conclude that the existence of just cause or excuse is an 
affirmative defense to a § 113(a)(3) violation, and the 
defendant bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Taylor also raises two issues relating to his 
testimony and offers of proof regarding justification for the 
assault and complains that he was selectively prosecuted.  We 
conclude, however, that none of those arguments has merit.  
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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I. 
 
A.  Factual Background 
 
In the fall of 2006, defendant Aaron Taylor, who had 
been convicted of drug and weapons charges, was an inmate 
at the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Philadelphia.  
Because of some prior disciplinary violations, including 
previous prison assaults, Taylor was assigned to the Special 
Housing Unit (SHU), separate from the general prison 
population.   
Prisoners in the SHU are allowed one hour of 
recreation a day, five days a week, in a fifteen-by-fifteen foot 
yard.  Before each session, a guard asks every inmate whether 
he would like to take or decline recreation.  Two guards then 
handcuff each inmate who desires recreation and transport 
him to one of five enclosed yards.  After the inmate enters the 
yard, he turns his back to the locked door and places his 
cuffed hands into a slot (also called a “wicket”) so the guards 
on the other side of the door can uncuff him.  The same 
process occurs at the end of the hour:  one at a time, the 
inmates back up to the wicket so the guards can handcuff 
them.  Once all of the inmates have been handcuffed, the 
guards unlock the door and transport the inmates back to their 
cells.  According to a prison guard who testified at Taylor‟s 
trial, an inmate may decline recreation, and be returned to his 
cell, at any time during the hour.   
According to Taylor, racial tensions at the FDC were 
inflamed in September 2006 when a white, female 
psychiatrist told Taylor, who is black, to stop looking at her.  
Wayne Maruzin, a white inmate, overheard the exchange and, 
according to Taylor, later discussed the incident with Peter 
4 
 
Bistrian, another white inmate.  Bistrian then threatened 
Taylor.  About a week later, Taylor filed a complaint with the 
warden asserting that the psychiatrist‟s comments were 
racially motivated and exacerbated racial tension among the 
inmates.   
In early October 2006, a guard mistakenly gave Taylor 
an extra razor blade.  Taylor used the extra blade to fashion a 
knife, or “shank.”   
Then, on October 12, 2006, Taylor was placed in the 
same recreation yard with Bistrian.  The guards removed 
Taylor‟s handcuffs before they removed Bistrian‟s, and the 
two paced the yard for almost the entire hour.  Taylor testified 
that Bistrian did not make any aggressive move towards him 
during the hour, but, after half an hour, Bistrian asked him 
what he was looking at and, later, told him he was “going 
down,” which Taylor understood to mean that Bistrian was 
“going to come after” him. 
At the end of the hour, Bistrian backed up to the 
wicket to be handcuffed.  Taylor, who had not yet been 
handcuffed, followed Bistrian, and, as soon as Bistrian was 
handcuffed, attacked him.  Taylor punched Bistrian and 
slashed his face, arms, and legs with the shank.  Bistrian fell 
to the ground and kicked at Taylor.  Taylor ignored the 
guards‟ repeated commands to stop and continued attacking 
Bistrian for more than two-and-a-half minutes.  The guards 
used three cans of pepper spray to try to subdue Taylor but 
did not succeed until they tossed a “flash bang” grenade into 
the yard, stunning him.  When the guards entered the yard, 
Taylor told them repeatedly that he “had to get” Bistrian 
before Bistrian got him.  Bistrian was treated at the hospital 
5 
 
for deep cuts to his face, arms, and legs.  The entire incident 
was captured on video by the FDC‟s surveillance cameras. 
B.  Procedural History 
Taylor was indicted and charged with assault with a 
dangerous weapon, under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), and assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury, under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 113(a)(6), in May 2007.  The government ultimately sought 
dismissal of the second count, and the case went to trial on a 
single count of assault with a dangerous weapon on 
November 30, 2010.  Taylor did not dispute that he had 
attacked Bistrian, but attempted to show that he was justified 
in doing so.  Taylor was convicted on December 3, 2010, and, 
on June 28, 2011, was sentenced to 120 months in prison, to 
be served consecutively to the federal sentence he was 
serving when the assault occurred. 
Before trial, Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment 
for selective prosecution.  His theory was that the prosecution 
was racially motivated because he was charged for this 
assault, on a white victim, but had not been charged for an 
earlier assault, also using razor blades, on two black inmates.  
The District Court denied the motion without ordering the 
government to produce discovery or holding a hearing. 
Also before trial, the government filed motions in 
limine for a hearing on, and then to preclude altogether, 
Taylor‟s justification defense.  The government argued that 
Taylor‟s evidence, which consisted of testimony from Taylor, 
several fact witnesses, and an expert on prison culture and 
would have described the racial tensions in the prison and 
asserted that Bistrian‟s threats against Taylor justified the 
attack, failed to establish the defense as a matter of law.   
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In this Circuit, the elements of justification are: 
First, that [the defendant] was 
under an immediate, unlawful 
threat of death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or to others; 
Second, that [the defendant] had a 
well-grounded [or reasonable] 
fear that the threat would be 
carried out if he did not commit 
the offense; 
Third, that [the defendant‟s] 
criminal action was directly 
caused by the need to avoid the 
threatened harm and that [the 
defendant] had no reasonable, 
lawful opportunity to avoid the 
threatened harm without 
committing the offense; that is, 
that [the defendant] had no 
reasonable lawful opportunity 
both to refuse to do the criminal 
act and also to avoid the 
threatened harm; and  
Fourth, that [the defendant] had 
not recklessly placed himself in a 
situation in which he would be 
forced to engage in criminal 
conduct. 
Third Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 8.04.   
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The District Court held a hearing on November 22, 
2010, at which Taylor made an offer of proof.  Two days 
later, the District Court denied the government‟s motion 
without prejudice and decided to allow Taylor to testify.  The 
Court stated, “I‟m going to allow the defendant to testify to 
whatever the defendant is going to testify to.  . . . [I]f the 
defendant testifies to justification, whether or not I allow the 
defendant to call any other witnesses to support that will 
depend entirely on what the defendant has to say.”  At the 
same time, the District Court made clear that it was skeptical 
of the merits of Taylor‟s proffer:   
Mr. Cedrone [Taylor‟s attorney], 
as you described [Taylor‟s] 
testimony yesterday, it doesn‟t 
cover all the elements [of a 
justification defense] and the ex 
parte submission you‟ve made 
today . . . also doesn‟t cover all 
the elements.  . . . .   
However, I‟m not going to — 
whatever discretion I may have to 
preclude a defendant‟s testimony 
with respect to justification, I‟m 
not going to exercise that 
discretion.  I‟m going to allow the 
defendant to testify, tell his story, 
and at the conclusion of his 
testimony we will revisit the issue 
of whether or not you may call 
any witnesses to corroborate that. 
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Just to give you an idea of what 
my thinking is, based on your 
proffer, your proffer does not 
offer a defense of justification.  It 
covers, perhaps, one element but 
it certainly doesn‟t cover all the 
required elements. 
The government objected to the District Court‟s ruling, 
arguing that, because of the lack of support for his defense, 
Taylor should not be allowed to testify as to justification.   
At trial, Taylor moved for a judgment of acquittal after 
the prosecution rested its case.  The District Court denied the 
motion.  Taylor took the stand and presented his version of 
the events surrounding the attack.  Before he was allowed to 
present additional witnesses, however, the District Court 
asked Taylor for a second offer of proof.  Taylor proffered the 
testimony of five fact witnesses and his prison-culture expert.  
None of the proposed witnesses actually saw the assault; 
Taylor proposed that they would testify about the earlier 
incident with the prison psychiatrist, the resulting racial 
tensions, and the fact that Bistrian knew how to escape from 
handcuffs and use them as a weapon (to bolster Taylor‟s 
theory that Bistrian was more dangerous when cuffed than 
when the inmates were pacing together in the yard).  After 
Taylor‟s proffer, the District Court precluded him from 
putting on any of the proffered witnesses.  It reasoned as 
follows: 
I believe [Taylor] had a 
reasonable lawful opportunity to 
avoid this simply by asking to be 
taken out of the cage.  I believe 
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that [Taylor] acted recklessly by 
remaining in the cage, where 
according to [Taylor], he was 
being taunted.  He was being 
taunted a half hour before the 
attack, and he remained in the 
cage and didn‟t ask to be taken 
out. 
And so assuming for a moment 
that I have to accept the absurd 
notion that a man is more 
dangerous and creates an 
imminent threat when he puts 
himself in handcuffs and that 
[Taylor‟s] attack on him for . . . 
. . .  
Two minutes and thirty-seven 
seconds, [Taylor] was attacking 
Mr. Bistrian with a deadly 
weapon through three cans of OC 
spray, I just think you haven‟t 
remotely made out justification.  I 
don‟t think there was an 
immediate unlawful threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to 
himself or others. 
I think that taking all the evidence 
in the light most favorable to 
[Taylor], I don‟t think [Taylor] 
thought he was about to attack 
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him.  I think [Taylor‟s] testimony 
is that he was concerned that he 
might, and he was going to get 
him first.  Taking [Taylor‟s] 
testimony as true, I think your 
client wanted to do a preemptive 
strike, and he thought at some 
point, accepting what he says is 
true, that Mr. Bistrian was going 
to attack him, but certainly not in 
that cage, certainly not in that 
cage. 
And second, that he had a well 
grounded fear or a reasonable 
belief that the threat would be 
carried out if he did not commit 
the offense.  Each time he cut Mr. 
Bistrian, that could be construed 
as a separate assault.  And 
certainly by the time Mr. Bistrian 
was on the ground, and [Taylor] 
continued to cut him with the 
knife, he couldn‟t possibly have 
had a well grounded or reasonable 
fear that the threat would be 
carried out if he didn‟t keep 
knifing him. 
But perhaps, perhaps most 
significantly, that Mr. Taylor‟s 
criminal action was directly 
caused by the need to avoid the 
threatened harm, and that Mr. 
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Taylor had no reasonable lawful 
opportunity to avoid the 
threatened harm without 
committing the offense.  I think 
he plainly did, and he didn‟t avail 
himself of that opportunity.  He 
didn‟t even try.  He never asked 
the guard to be taken out.  And I 
don‟t think that — I don‟t think he 
availed himself of that reasonable 
lawful opportunity. 
And so although I would allow 
[Taylor] to call Mr. Bistrian 
because he‟s the victim of this 
case, [Taylor has] elected not to 
call Mr. Bistrian, and the other 
witnesses, I believe down to the 
expert, do not provide . . . , 
accepting everything they say is 
true, don‟t provide [Taylor] with a 
complete defense of justification, 
and so I have the discretion to 
preclude the presentation of that 
defense. 
The District Court instructed the jury that the government 
bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Taylor: (1) struck Bistrian intentionally; (2) used a dangerous 
weapon, i.e., a razor, as charged in the indictment; (3) acted 
with the intent to cause bodily harm; and (4) intentionally 
struck Bistrian within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.  The District Court declined 
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to provide any instruction concerning a just cause or excuse 
for the offense.   
After his conviction, Taylor moved for acquittal and 
for a new trial.  The District Court issued a 19-page written 
opinion denying the motions and explaining, among other 
things, its decisions to preclude Taylor from offering 
additional witnesses and not to instruct the jury about 
justification.  In response to Taylor‟s argument that the 
absence of just cause or excuse is an element of an 18 U.S.C. 
§ 113(a)(3) offense, the District Court concluded that the 
absence of just cause or excuse is an affirmative defense to, 
not an element of, a § 113(a)(3) violation.   
Taylor now appeals.
1
 
II. 
On appeal, Taylor first argues that the District Court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury that the absence of just 
cause or excuse is an element of an 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) 
offense that the government must establish by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) provides: 
Whoever, within the special 
maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, 
is guilty of an assault shall be 
punished as follows . . . Assault 
                                                 
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  Our jurisdiction to review the judgment of 
conviction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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with a dangerous weapon, with 
intent to do bodily harm, and 
without just cause or excuse, by a 
fine under this title or 
imprisonment for not more than 
ten years, or both. 
(emphasis added).  The language of this provision is unique in 
the federal assault statute, 18 U.S.C. § 113:  of the seven 
types of assault listed, only this provision, for assault with a 
dangerous weapon, includes a specific reference to “just 
cause or excuse.”  Although we cannot be sure why Congress 
included those words in subsection (a)(3), but not in the other 
subsections of the statute, the weight of the authority and 
relevant Supreme Court precedent support the District Court‟s 
conclusion that they refer to an affirmative defense that the 
defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Few cases have discussed this point in any detail.  But, 
as both parties acknowledge, the great majority of cases 
describing the elements of § 113(a)(3) or its predecessor, 
§ 113(c), state (without much, or any, supporting analysis) 
that a conviction under that subsection requires proof of only 
three elements:  (1) assault; (2) with specific intent to inflict 
bodily harm; and (3) use of a “dangerous weapon.”  See, e.g., 
United States v. Herron, 539 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(“The elements of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon require 
that the defendant:  1) assault the victim; 2) intend to do 
bodily harm; and 3) use a dangerous weapon to commit the 
assault.”); United States v. Smith, 520 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (stating that assault with a dangerous weapon 
under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) “has three elements:  (1) that the 
defendant intentionally struck or wounded the victim; (2) that 
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the defendant acted with the specific intent to do bodily harm; 
and (3) that the defendant used a „dangerous weapon‟”); see 
also United States v. Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d 491, 494 
(5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 
784, 786 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 967 F.2d 
1431, 1433 (10th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by 
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 162 (1998).  These 
cases do not list the lack of a just cause or excuse as an 
element of the offense.   
Another line of cases acknowledges the statute‟s 
“without just cause or excuse” language and explicitly 
concludes that the government does not need to plead or 
prove the absence of a just cause or excuse to secure a 
conviction under § 113(a)(3).  The most recent of these, and 
the one on which the District Court primarily relied, is United 
States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982).  In that 
case, after reciting the three elements of assault with a 
dangerous weapon listed above, the court said, “[t]he 
existence of „just cause or excuse‟ for the assault is an 
affirmative defense, and the government does not have the 
burden of pleading or proving its absence.”  Id. at 1343.  The 
opinion cites a string of cases for that proposition, the most 
substantive of which is Hockenberry v. United States, 422 
F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1970).  There, the court reasoned: 
It was not necessary [for the 
indictment] to recite that the 
assault was „without just cause or 
excuse.‟  If there was such cause 
or excuse, the defendant could 
show it; the government did not 
have the burden of pleading or 
proving its absence.  By a rule of 
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long standing, „an indictment or 
other pleading founded on a 
general provision defining the 
elements of an offense, or of a 
right conferred, need not negative 
the matter of an exception made 
by a proviso or other distinct 
clause, whether in the same 
section or elsewhere, and * * * it 
is incumbent on one who relies on 
such an exception to set it up and 
establish it.‟ 
Id. at 173 (quoting McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 
357 (1922)).  Although the reasoning in these cases is not 
extensive, they support the District Court‟s conclusion.2 
                                                 
2
  Taylor seeks to distinguish these cases by pointing out that 
Hockenberry, which arose out of a challenge to indictment, 
concerned which party bears the burden of pleading 
justification, not which party bears the burden of proving that 
issue.  He does not explain the significance of that distinction, 
but he presumably intends to argue that, by including the 
“without just cause or excuse” language in the statute, 
Congress set up a burden-shifting scheme in which the 
defendant bears the burden of raising a justification that the 
government must then disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.  
As we discuss below, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Dixon 
v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006), forecloses any such 
argument.  Moreover, even though Taylor is right that 
Hockenberry involved a pleading question, Guilbert did not:  
the issue in that case was whether the evidence was sufficient 
to support a conviction, which necessarily entails the question 
16 
 
To counter all of this authority, Taylor cites a single 
case:  United States v. Bordeaux, 570 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 
2009).  In Bordeaux, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a 
§ 113(a)(3) conviction, included “acted without just cause or 
excuse” in a list of elements of the offense, and analyzed 
whether the government “presented sufficient evidence that 
Bordeaux acted without just cause or excuse.”  Id. at 1047-48.  
But the court did not consider whether that element should 
more properly be treated as an affirmative defense, and the 
government does not appear to have raised the issue.  
Additionally, as the government points out here, the court‟s 
interpretation of the offense in Bordeaux is inconsistent with 
another of its cases from the previous year, in which it 
omitted the “just cause or excuse” language from a recitation 
of the elements of the offense.  See Herron, 539 F.3d at 886.  
Given these facts, Bordeaux does not present an especially 
compelling counterpoint to the numerous cases suggesting 
that “just cause or excuse” is an affirmative defense.3 
                                                                                                             
of the burden of proof.  Thus, even if Hockenberry is 
distinguishable on the ground Taylor suggests, Guilbert is 
not. 
 
3
  United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1976), 
which Taylor raised in a post-argument submission, is 
similarly unhelpful.  There, the court merely affirmed a 
defendant‟s assault-with-a-dangerous-weapon conviction over 
a challenge that the district court failed properly to notify the 
defendant of a change in the jury instructions.  Id. at 683.  
The district court had decided, at the last minute, to include 
the absence of just cause or excuse as an element of the 
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Relevant Supreme Court precedent also supports the 
District Court‟s interpretation.  Specifically, in McKelvey v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922), the Supreme Court 
rejected an argument that the government erred in failing to 
charge in an indictment that the defendant did not fall within 
an exception contained in the statute.
4
  It stated: 
                                                                                                             
offense in its instructions.  The government did not dispute, 
and the court did not analyze, the substance of that decision. 
 
4
  McKelvey involved a charge of unlawfully obstructing free 
passage over unoccupied public lands of the United States.  
The relevant statute stated: 
 
That no person, by force, threats, 
intimidation, or by any fencing or 
inclosing, or any other unlawful 
means, shall prevent or obstruct, 
or shall combine and confederate 
with others to prevent or obstruct, 
any person from peaceably 
entering upon or establishing a 
settlement or residence on any 
tract of public land subject to 
settlement or entry under the 
public land laws of the United 
States, or shall prevent or obstruct 
free passage or transit over or 
through the public lands: 
Provided, this section shall not be 
held to affect the right or title of 
persons, who have gone upon, 
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By repeated decisions it has come 
to be a settled rule in this 
jurisdiction that an indictment or 
other pleading founded on a 
general provision defining the 
elements of an offense, or of a 
right conferred, need not negative 
the matter of an exception made 
by a proviso or other distinct 
clause, whether in the same 
section or elsewhere, and that it is 
incumbent on one who relies on 
such an exception to set it up and 
establish it. 
Id. at 357.  Although McKelvey dealt solely with the 
sufficiency of an indictment, the last sentence of the quoted 
passage suggests that a defendant relying on an exception 
must both raise the exception and “establish it.”  In other 
words, where the statute contains such an exception, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving it.
5
 
                                                                                                             
improved or occupied said lands 
under the land laws of the United 
States, claiming title thereto, in 
good faith. 
 
260 U.S. at 356 (quoting 23 Stat. 321 (Comp. St. § 4999)). 
 
5
  We use McKelvey to illustrate our point here because it is 
often cited as the source of this rule.  See, e.g., Dixon, 548 
U.S. at 13-14.  In fact, however, numerous Supreme Court 
decisions before McKelvey, dating back at least to 1841, held 
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Of course, that is not the end of the analysis:  applying 
the McKelvey rule in this case naturally begs the question 
whether the “just cause or excuse” language in § 113(a)(3) 
qualifies as an “exception made by a proviso or other distinct 
clause.”  Whether a particular statutory phrase constitutes a 
defense or an element of the offense under McKelvey turns on 
whether “the statutory definition is such that the crime may 
not be properly described without reference to the exception.”  
United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 973 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(citing United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168, 173-74 (1872)), 
aff’d in relevant part, 256 F.3d 971, 980 (10th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc).  If so, the exception is an element of the crime.  If not, 
the exception is a defense.  We conclude that, under the plain 
language of McKelvey as supplemented by this test, the “just 
cause or excuse” is a defense to, rather than an element of, 
§ 113(a)(3).   
As McKelvey requires, the “without just cause or 
excuse” language in § 113(a)(3) appears in a “distinct 
clause,” set off by commas from the rest of the statute.  This 
alone is not dispositive, however, since the phrase “with 
                                                                                                             
that the party who wishes to rely on an exception to an Act of 
Congress must raise it and establish it.  See, e.g., Schlemmer 
v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1907) 
(holding that a defendant who “wishe[s] to rely upon [a] 
proviso” bears “the burden . . . to bring itself within an 
exception”) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (Holmes, J.); 
United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141, 165 (1841) (“In short, 
a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting 
clause; and those who set up any such exception, must 
establish it as being within the words as well as within the 
reasons thereof.”). 
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intent to do bodily harm,” which does set forth an element, 
also appears in a distinct clause.  More importantly, the 
former clause falls outside of the “definition” test set forth 
above because the offense may properly be described as an 
“[a]ssault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily 
harm,” without referencing the “just cause or excuse” 
language.
6
  Indeed, as discussed above, most cases that have 
identified the elements of the offense have done precisely 
that.  Thus, we have no problem concluding that the “without 
just cause or excuse” language in § 113(a)(3) is an “exception 
made by a . . . distinct clause,” such that, under McKelvey, “it 
is incumbent on” the defendant, “who relies on” the 
exception, “to set it up and establish it.”  260 U.S. at 357. 
Another, more recent Supreme Court case, Dixon v. 
United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006), reinforces our conclusion 
that Taylor bore the burden of establishing the existence of a 
just cause or excuse in this case.  In Dixon, the defendant, 
who was indicted and tried on federal firearms charges, 
asserted a duress defense.  She argued that as the defendant, 
she bore the burden of production on the defense, but that the 
burden then shifted to the government to disprove it beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It first concluded that 
placing the burden of proving duress on the defendant did not 
                                                 
6
  Taylor effectively concedes this point in his brief, when he 
states that the statute “requires the government to prove the 
absence of „just cause or excuse‟ when applicable under the 
facts of a given case.”  Appellant‟s Br. 31 (emphasis added).  
If, as Taylor suggests, the “just cause or excuse” language 
does not apply in every case, then, plainly, the absence of a 
just cause or excuse is not an essential element of the offense. 
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violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because 
proof of duress could “in no way disprove[] an element” of 
the firearm-possession charge, including the requisite 
“knowing” mens rea.  Id. at 7; see also United States v. Dodd, 
225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although the Due Process 
Clause requires the government to prove all elements of the 
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore 
requires the government to disprove beyond a reasonable 
doubt any defenses that negate an element of the charged 
offense, there is no constitutional bar to the defendant‟s 
bearing the burden of persuasion on defenses that do not 
negate an element of the offense.”).   
The Dixon Court also held that placing the burden of 
proving duress on the defendant in that case comported with 
federal common law.  It noted that, “at common law, the 
burden of proving affirmative defenses—indeed, all . . . 
circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation—rested 
on the defendant.”  Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  This rule, the Court went on to 
explain, “accords with the general evidentiary rule that the 
burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion with regard 
to any given issue are both generally allocated to the same 
party” and “the doctrine that where the facts with regard to an 
issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has 
the burden of proving the issue.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  The Court then reasoned that, 
even though the firearm offense statute “does not mention the 
defense of duress,” it could “safely assume that the 1968 
Congress [that enacted the firearm statute] was familiar with 
both the long-established common-law rule and the rule 
applied in McKelvey” and that Congress “would have 
expected federal courts to apply a similar approach to any 
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affirmative defense that might be asserted as a justification or 
excuse for violating the new law.”  Id. at 13-14 (footnote 
omitted).  In other words, the Court “presume[d] that 
Congress intended the petitioner to bear the burden of proving 
the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
Id. at 17. 
The same logic applies in this case.  The existence of 
just cause or excuse does not disprove the elements of assault 
under § 113(a)(3), namely, physical attack, intent to do bodily 
harm, and use of a dangerous weapon.  Accordingly, under 
the rule of Dixon and Dodd, placing the burden of proving the 
absence of just cause or excuse on the defendant does not run 
afoul of the Due Process Clause.   
And, as Dixon makes clear, placing the burden of 
proving justification on Taylor in this case also is consistent 
with common law and basic principles of statutory 
interpretation.  The same common-law rule that places the 
burden of proving duress on the defendant also applies to 
issues involving justification or excuse.  Id. at 8.  That rule 
makes sense here for the same reasons the Court noted in 
Dixon:  it allocates the burdens of production and persuasion 
to the same party, and it places those burdens on the party 
with peculiar knowledge of the relevant facts.  In this case, 
Taylor‟s justification defense depended on his testimony that 
he feared that Bistrian would attack him first and that he 
feared Bistrian would slip out of his handcuffs and use them 
as a weapon.  Particularly given its inability to compel Taylor 
to testify, the government would have had a difficult time 
obtaining that information on its own.   
Moreover, the inference about congressional intent the 
Court relied on in Dixon — that, absent some indication to 
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the contrary, Congress intended that the “long-established 
common-law rule” that the defendant bears the burden of 
proving justification or excuse and “the rule applied in 
McKelvey” would guide federal courts‟ analyses — applies 
with even greater force in this case.
7
  If we are to presume, as 
the Court did in Dixon, that Congress legislates with those 
rules in mind, then surely more than a simple reference to a 
particular defense, as in § 113(a)(3), is needed to evince 
Congress‟s intent to convert a traditional common-law 
defense into an element of the government‟s affirmative case.  
Indeed, given that the Dixon Court considered the absence of 
any reference to a duress defense in the firearm statute to be a 
weakness, see, e.g., 548 U.S. at 13-14 (“Even though the Safe 
Streets Act does not mention the defense of duress, we can 
safely assume that the 1968 Congress was familiar with both 
the long-established common-law rule and the rule applied in 
McKelvey and that it would have expected federal courts to 
apply a similar approach to any affirmative defense that might 
be asserted as a justification or excuse for violating the new 
law.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)), the same 
inferences must apply even more forcefully in a case like this 
one, in which the statute specifically mentions the defense.  
Accordingly, we interpret § 113(a)(3)‟s reference to a 
justification or excuse as a reference to common-law 
                                                 
7
  We are aware that McKelvey was decided in 1922, whereas 
the relevant statutory language in this case was enacted 
earlier, in 1909.  But, as noted above, the principle for which 
McKelvey stands was established and applied in numerous 
pre-1909 Supreme Court decisions.  Thus, the substance of 
Dixon‟s presumption retains its force in this case. 
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justification and excuse defenses, which the defendant bears 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence.
8
 
We do not lightly dismiss Taylor‟s textual argument, 
that reading the statute in this way renders the words “without 
just cause or excuse” superfluous because courts have 
allowed defendants to raise common-law justification 
defenses to the other subsections of § 113 that do not contain 
                                                 
8
 For similar reasons, Dixon also forecloses Taylor‟s 
alternative argument that the reference to just cause or excuse 
in § 113(a)(3) implies a complicated burden-shifting 
paradigm, in which the burden shifts to the government to 
disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt after the 
defendant raises the issue and adduces some evidence to 
support it.  See Appellant‟s Reply Br. 5-6 (citing United 
States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2003)).  For 
one thing, nothing in the text of the statute suggests such an 
approach.  It would run counter to Dixon‟s presumption that 
Congress legislates with common-law principles in mind to 
conclude that Congress intended to set up a burden-shifting 
scheme when all it did was use the words “without just cause 
or excuse.”  More directly, this is precisely the argument that 
the Supreme Court rejected in Dixon.  Dixon conceded that 
she bore the burden of production on her duress defense, 548 
U.S. at 4, but argued that “modern common law” requires the 
government to disprove affirmative defenses beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases, see id. at 8.  The Supreme 
Court rejected that argument and applied “[t]he long-
established common-law rule . . . that the burden of proving 
duress rests on the defendant” instead.  Id. at 15.  Taylor has 
offered us no reason to conclude, contrary to Dixon, that the 
ordinary common-law rule does not govern this case as well. 
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that phrase.  Indeed, we confess that, given the complete 
absence of legislative history and the fact that the language 
was first added to the statute in 1909, we cannot be entirely 
sure what Congress had in mind.  But two additional points 
bolster our conclusion that “without just cause or excuse” is 
not an element of a § 113(a)(3) offense.  First, although 
mindful of the general principle that we should avoid 
interpretations that effectively read words out of a statute, see, 
e.g., Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 
2001), we believe that the specific, on-point Supreme Court 
cases in this area, McKelvey and Dixon, take precedence over 
that broad, generally applicable canon of statutory 
interpretation here. 
Second, we question the foundations of Taylor‟s 
argument.  Taylor presumes that defendants charged with 
assaults under subsections of § 113 other than § 113(a)(3) 
may pursue common-law defenses, and, indeed, the 
government admits that its practice has been not to object to 
self-defense or other justification instructions in cases 
prosecuted under other subsections of § 113.  But the 
government‟s practice is not conclusive evidence of 
congressional intent.  Because “federal crimes are defined by 
statute rather than by common law,” United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001), the 
availability of common-law defenses to federal crimes is not a 
foregone conclusion, cf. id. at 491 (reserving the question 
whether common-law necessity “can ever be a defense when 
the federal statute does not expressly provide for it”); see also 
Dixon, 548 U.S. at 13 & n.7 (assuming, without deciding, that 
common-law duress defense is available to federal statutory 
firearm crime).  Perhaps, by including the “without just cause 
or excuse” language in the predecessor versions of 
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§ 113(a)(3), but not in the other subsections of § 113, 
Congress intended to make common-law justification and 
excuse defenses available for assaults with a dangerous 
weapon, but not for the other assault offenses set forth in 
§ 113.  We need not reach any definitive conclusion on this 
issue, however, because we are satisfied that the other reasons 
set forth above adequately support our conclusion as to the 
meaning of those words in § 113(a)(3). 
In light of McKelvey, Dixon, and for the reasons 
discussed above, we agree with the District Court that in this 
case the burden of proving a “just cause or excuse” for the 
assault rested with Taylor, the defendant. 
III. 
Taylor raises three additional issues, none of which 
warrants reversal.  First, Taylor challenges the District 
Court‟s exclusion of certain additional witnesses related to his 
justification defense and its refusal to instruct the jury on 
justification.  But, as the District Court correctly found, the 
evidence plainly does not support such a defense.  Second, 
Taylor argues that the District Court infringed his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination by “forcing” him 
to testify as a condition precedent to admitting the remaining 
evidence of his justification defense.  In fact, though, the 
District Court did not force Taylor to testify at all, and it 
clearly informed him from the outset that the proffered 
evidence was insufficient to establish justification as a matter 
of law.  Third, and finally, Taylor appeals the District Court‟s 
denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for selective 
prosecution.  Taylor‟s theory here — that he was prosecuted 
for an assault on a white inmate, but not for an earlier assault 
on two black inmates — does not suggest, let alone provide 
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the required “clear evidence” of, discriminatory intent or 
effect. 
A. 
The District Court did not err in precluding Taylor 
from offering additional witnesses to support his justification 
defense or in refusing to include the defense in its jury 
charge.  The tests for precluding a defendant from offering a 
defense and for denying an instruction on a particular defense 
are the same:  whether the evidence presented (or proffered) 
is legally sufficient to support the defense.  See United States 
v. Mike, 655 F.3d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (defendant whose 
evidence does not support a particular affirmative defense is 
not “entitled” to a jury instruction on that defense); United 
States v. Miller, 59 F.3d 417, 421-22 (3d Cir. 1995) (district 
court did not err in precluding defendant from offering 
evidence of duress where proffered evidence was insufficient 
to establish duress as a matter of law); cf. Mathews v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (“As a general proposition a 
defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized 
defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find in his favor.” (emphasis added)).   
The District Court properly analyzed Taylor‟s proffer 
under the Model Jury Instructions,
9
 and concluded that his 
                                                 
9
  Taylor‟s argument on appeal that the District Court applied 
the wrong test to evaluate his justification defense is 
meritless.  The model instruction applies broadly across all 
types of cases.  Moreover, although Taylor argues that the 
District Court should have evaluated his defense according to 
“general justification principles,” he does not articulate what 
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proposed defense did not satisfy any of the required elements, 
as follows.  First, Taylor was not facing an immediate threat 
of attack because Bistrian was handcuffed.  Second, Taylor 
did not have a reasonable fear that the threat would be carried 
out if he did not attack Bistrian.  Taylor‟s assertion that 
Bistrian was more dangerous in handcuffs, since he knew 
how to escape them and use them as a weapon, was belied by 
the fact that Taylor did not feel the need to attack Bistrian 
when he was handcuffed at the beginning of the recreation 
hour.  Third, Taylor‟s attack was not directly caused by a 
need to avoid harm because it was not made in response to 
any immediate threat by Bistrian.  Despite Bistrian‟s alleged 
verbal threat to Taylor during the recreation time, Bistrian 
and Taylor had been pacing together in the same cage without 
any physical contact for almost an hour before Taylor 
attacked.  Moreover, Taylor did not take any steps to avoid 
any perceived threat, e.g., he did not report the threats to 
prison staff or ask to be removed from the yard at any time.
10
  
Fourth, and finally, by choosing to remain in the yard with 
Bistrian, rather than asking the authorities to take him back to 
his cell (which the prison guards testified they would have 
                                                                                                             
those principles are or how they differ from the model-
instruction standard the District Court applied. 
 
10
  Also, as the District Court pointed out in its oral decision, 
the attack continued for two minutes and thirty-seven 
seconds, despite the guards‟ use of three cans of pepper spray, 
and only ended when the guards used a “flash bang” grenade 
to stun Taylor.  All of those facts are inconsistent with 
limited, defensive action that is necessary to avoid imminent 
harm. 
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done), Taylor recklessly placed himself in the situation that 
gave rise to the assault.   
The District Court‟s conclusions are manifestly 
correct.  Moreover, as the District Court also noted, none of 
the testimony Taylor proffered would have remedied the 
defects the District Court identified.  On this record, it is 
difficult to imagine any reasonable person reaching a contrary 
result.   
B. 
Taylor argues that the District Court violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights by requiring him to take the stand as a 
condition precedent to the presentation of his justification 
defense.  To support his argument, Taylor relies primarily on 
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), in which the 
Supreme Court held that a Tennessee statute that required 
defendants who intended to testify to take the stand as the 
first defense witness violated the Fifth Amendment.  Noting 
that a defendant “cannot be absolutely certain that his 
witnesses will testify as expected or that they will be effective 
on the stand,” the Court held that the Tennessee statute “cast[] 
a heavy burden on a defendant‟s otherwise unconditional 
right not to take the stand” by forcing him to testify before the 
precise contours of the other witnesses‟ testimony were 
known.  Id. at 609-11.  The same thing happened in this case, 
Taylor argues, because the District Court suspended its ruling 
on the merits of his justification defense until after he 
testified, thereby denying Taylor the choice to remain silent 
depending on the testimony of the other witnesses.   
That argument fails on the facts.  The District Court 
did not force Taylor to testify.  Instead, it denied the 
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government‟s request to preclude Taylor from testifying.11  
And, unlike in Brooks, the District Court here was not 
enforcing a blanket rule about defendant‟s testimony; it made 
a careful, case-specific and well founded decision after 
considering the defendant‟s proffer.  Furthermore, the District 
Court made clear from the outset, before Taylor testified, that 
it did not believe that Taylor‟s testimony, standing alone or as 
corroborated by the proposed additional witnesses, would 
establish all of the necessary elements of a justification 
defense, allowing Taylor to make an informed decision as to 
whether he should testify.  Thus, this case simply does not 
raise the same type of concerns as Brooks. 
Moreover, as the District Court pointed out (and 
Taylor‟s counsel acknowledged), the testimony of the other 
witnesses, none of whom observed the actual assault, was 
offered only to “corroborate or support” Taylor‟s version of 
events.  Absent Taylor‟s testimony, then, none of the other 
witnesses‟ testimony would even have been relevant to the 
case.
12
  Thus, the alternative to the District Court‟s ruling in 
                                                 
11
  Under the circumstances of this case, we need not, and do 
not, evaluate the District Court‟s statement that it could have 
precluded Taylor from testifying altogether. 
 
12
  In that respect, this case is like United States v. Singh, 811 
F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1987), in which the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected a defendant‟s argument based on Brooks.  
There, the district court had precluded the defendant from 
pursuing certain lines of cross examination based on hearsay 
until the defendant offered a first-hand account of the 
underlying events.  The Second Circuit concluded that “the 
[district] court did not compel appellant to testify at all”; 
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this case was not that Taylor would have remained silent until 
all of the other witnesses testified, as the Court envisioned in 
Brooks; it was that all of the testimony, including Taylor‟s, 
would have been excluded.
13
  We do not find any Fifth 
Amendment violation in this case. 
C. 
Finally, Taylor appeals the District Court‟s decisions 
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for selective 
prosecution and denying him discovery on that motion.  His 
theory is that he was improperly selected for prosecution 
because his victim in this case was white.  To support that 
                                                                                                             
instead, “[i]t merely refused to accept the proffered testimony 
of other witnesses until a proper foundation was laid.”  Id. at 
762.  The same is true here:  Taylor‟s testimony provided the 
necessary foundation for the testimony of the other proposed 
witnesses.  See generally Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 
80, 86 (1976) (trial judge in a criminal case “may determine 
generally the order in which parties will adduce proof”; “may 
refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant 
testimony”; and must “exert substantial control over the 
proceedings”). 
 
13
  We note, further, that Taylor did not suffer any prejudice 
from the District Court‟s ruling.  This is not a case in which 
the defendant would have been acquitted absent his 
purportedly forced testimony.  Because the entire assault was 
captured on prison videotape, there was no question as to 
what happened or who was responsible for the assault; the 
only question was whether Taylor‟s actions were justified.  
And, as discussed above, the evidence Taylor proffered on 
that issue was legally insufficient to support his defense. 
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claim, he pointed out that he was not prosecuted for an earlier 
assault on two black victims. 
When analyzing selective prosecution claims, we 
review district courts‟ findings of facts for clear error and the 
application of legal precepts de novo.  United States v. 
Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1989).  The district 
court‟s denial of discovery on such a motion is reviewable for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 
605 (3d Cir. 2004). 
To establish selective prosecution, the defendant must 
“provide evidence that persons similarly situated have not 
been prosecuted” and that “the decision to prosecute was 
made on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, 
religion, or some other arbitrary factor.”  Schoolcraft, 879 
F.2d at 68.  The defendant bears the burden of proof, id., and 
must establish each of these elements with “clear evidence” 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity that 
attaches to decisions to prosecute, United States v. Armstrong, 
517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).  “The required threshold to obtain 
discovery” on such a motion is “some evidence tending to 
show the existence of the essential elements of the defense, 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.”  Hedaithy, 
392 F.3d at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Given these high standards, it is clear that the District 
Court in this case did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Taylor discovery or err in denying his motion to dismiss.  
That Taylor was prosecuted for one assault, but not for 
another, does not, without more, provide “clear evidence” of 
a discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent.  Taylor has 
not offered any other examples of defendants who assaulted 
both white and black inmates, but were only prosecuted for 
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assaulting the white inmates.  And Taylor-after-the-second-
assault is not “similarly situated” to Taylor-after-the-first-
assault for the obvious reason that the incident that gave rise 
to the charges in this case occurred against the backdrop of 
Taylor‟s history of disciplinary problems, including the 
previous assault on the black inmates.  Accordingly, Taylor 
did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy the threshold for 
obtaining discovery on his selective prosecution claim, let 
alone dismissal of the indictment on those grounds, and this 
argument does not provide any basis on which we could or 
should reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
